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invaluable. The manufacturer may be asked to produce a number of
different designs, or a batch of a proven design. It is important that the
manufacturer understands its role from the start and is paid adequately.
Training of manufacturers on both technical and business matters can be
of great benefit. It is difficult for small manufacturers to keep abreast of
the technical developments and new products. General courses on the
benefits/constraints of wind energy, as well as courses covering design
and construction, should be considered.
The best help for manufacturers would be a healthy market for
wind generators. Although this might exist in theory, which means there
are sufficient wind resources, low electrification rates, current use of car
batteries, sufficient resources or credit available to buy generators, and a
lack of feasible alternatives, not much will happen unless the consumer
is aware of the product and the manufacturer is aware of the market.
Marketing is usually low on a small manufacturer's list of priorities.
Help with marketing can come in several forms, such as help with
market research, production of marketing literature, securing advertising
space, improving the company image, and better product design. Some
marketing can be coordinated through trade associations to keep costs
down or focused on individual manufacturers with the marketing
experts. For any small wind system, the sharing and disseminating of
information is crucial.
Ebitsam Seoudi Wilkins
Professor, Chemical and Nuclear Engineering
University of New Mexico
Crude Power: Politics and the Oil Market. By Oystein Noreng. London:
I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2002. Pp. 1254. $65.00 cloth.
Crude Power: Politics and the Oil Market, by Norwegian Oystein
Noreng, is an ambitious book. Noreng openly reveals his scholarly
intentions: to prepare a comprehensive examination of the interaction of
economic and political forces in the world oil market. The functioning of
the world oil market remains unexplained and unpredictable, largely
because of the shortcomings of applying traditional economic theories to
the complexities of oil. Economic theories typically make assumptions
about markets without adequate consideration of institutions, politics,
ideologies, and social conditions. These factors, says Noreng, must be
considered, or international relations surrounding the production and
use of oil will continue to be marked by volatility, unpredictability, and
violence.
The importance of oil to world politics and economics cannot be
overstated. Oil is prized and needed by all governments, yet, by
accidents of geology, oil is produced in large quantities by a relatively
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small number of countries. In terms of market value, oil is the world's
most important traded commodity. Oil is the only commodity capable of
causing worldwide macroeconomic effects; oil price fluctuations
reverberate throughout the world economy, with devastating
consequences for countries large and small, developed and underdeveloped areas, oil exporters and importers. Furthermore, oil is too
important to national security for even the most devoted of neo-liberal
governments to entrust supply and price to the open market. Conflicts
over oil routinely cause wars, and access to oil can alter the outcomes of
wars in progress.
Noreng concludes that to analyze such a complex issue he must
draw upon a wide range of theories, both economic and political.
However, his attempt at comprehensiveness is at once a strength and
weakness of his book. The strength lies in the book's impressive scope
and descriptiveness. There are few important issues and actors that
Noreng does not at least touch upon. The book exposes layer upon layer
of complexity. Reductionist impulses, such as viewing oil conflicts
primarily in terms of oil exporters versus oil consumers, are not easy to
justify after reading this book. Noreng illustrates the distinctly
individual interests that different states have in oil politics and
economics. These interests combine, multiply, and conflict in a dizzying
multitude of ways. The United States and France maneuver for influence
over Iraq's reemerging oil production. Iran and Iraq have large oil
reserves, matched by large, needy, increasingly restless populations.
Saudi Arabia relies on the United States as a marketplace and for
military security, yet American presence there foments domestic
disturbance and threatens the legitimacy of the ruling monarchy. Russia
is self-sufficient in oil, yet is involved in affairs of Middle East oil
exporters, and intends to exert influence over the impending
development of vast reserves in former Soviet republics of the Caspian
region. Noreng discusses all of these contentious arenas and numerous
others.
At times, such wide focus results in analytical sprawl. Crude
Power is enormously descriptive, but Noreng's explanations fail to
cohere under a theory that has much explanatory power. Indeed, though
the book is timely, published in 2002, it is also instantly dated -some of
its predictions have already been revealed to be mistaken. For example,
Noreng predicts that unilateral military action against Iraq will not
happen, because such an action would be excessively risky. As we now
know, the current U.S. administration either underestimated the risk or
determined that U.S. interests outweighed the risk and decided to
proceed with an essentially unilateral war. Crude Power suffers from a
lack of clarity regarding the theoretical underpinnings of the work.
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Noreng draws on elements of Realism, Institutionalism, Liberalism, and
rationalist economics such as game theory and competitive theory.
Unfortunately, various theories and infinite observations do not
necessarily lead to reliable generalizations or accurate predictions.
Noreng's economic theory is stronger and more illuminating
than his political theory. In a particularly interesting section of the book,
he analyzes strategies of cooperation and conflict among oil exporters,
especially within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). Several qualities of the oil market, he says, provide strong
incentives for cooperation among oil exporters. First, oil exporters
operate in a context of oligopoly, where a few producers can control the
market, competition is imperfect, and opportunities for collusion
abound. Second, oil demand is, at least in the short term, price inelastic that is, consumer need for oil is so acute that demand does not respond
quickly to price increases. Third, the cost of lifting oil from the ground is
much lower than the added productivity oil provides in the form of
reduced labor costs and development potential. This allows substantial
opportunity for collection of economic rent, defined as profit in excess of
cost of production.
These three factors produce ideal conditions for what economists
refer to as a "prisoner's dilemma." In the classic prisoners dilemma, two
prisoners may receive reduced sentences if they both agree to confess to
a crime. However, if, after agreeing, one cheats and allows the other to
take full blame, the first goes free and the second receives a stiffer
penalty. Thus, cooperation improves the outcome for both parties,
whereas reneging on the bargain results in an optimal outcome for the
cheater-a "free ride"-and a worse outcome for the party who is
faithful to the agreement - the "fool's reward."
The peculiarities of the oil market and the oligopolistic structure
of OPEC present the classic prisoner's dilemma, with additional
complexities arising from the existence of multiple players who repeat
the game over time and can learn of each other's strategies. OPEC
nations often agree to limit oil production below capacity, causing the
price of oil to rise, maximizing profit (economic rent) in relation to
volume sold. If OPEC countries are faithful to the bargain, a positive
outcome results for all. However, cheating is common. A country that
breaks the OPEC agreement sells more oil at high prices protected by
cooperating countries, benefiting from the cooperation of others while
maximizing profits and gaining market share for itself.
The stakes are high and the consequences can be tremendous.
Lack of cooperation causes oil price volatility and disastrous
consequences for the economies of oil importing countries. Also, tension
and mistrust between the players of the game can easily erupt into
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violence. Indeed, this occurred in the early 1990s when Kuwait cheated
on an OPEC agreement, producing above quota, at a time when
neighboring Iraq faced a large currency crisis and needed oil revenues to
pay high external debts and to support a growing population. Saddam
Hussein responded aggressively. Not content to reap the fool's reward,
Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait, an action only undone by massive
international diplomacy, cooperation, and finally war.
Ultimately, Crude Power is a fascinating foray into one of the
and problematic issues of our times. Noreng openly
intriguing
most
acknowledges the problem he faces in writing this book: no coherent
theory links important variables involved in the interaction of economic
and political forces in the world oil market in such a way as to yield
reliable predictive results. That he does not fully accomplish this
monumental task is only a mild criticism of an otherwise excellent book
of more descriptive than theoretical or predictive value.
Justin Miller
Class of 2005
University of New Mexico School of Law

